Ⅰ. Introduction
It is generally accepted that there is an inverse relationship between the prices of commodities such as oil, wheat, basic metals, etc. and the economy: when commodity prices fall, the economic effects of this are positive. This is because a fall in commodity prices leads to a decrease in living costs and an increase in real income. Moreover, when commodity prices fall, firms using commodities as inputs benefit from the low input prices.
Many studies have confirmed this inverse relationship between commodity prices (especially oil prices) and the economy. Hamilton (1983) presents evidence supporting the proposition that oil price shocks contributed to almost every U.S. recession over the 1948-72 period. Burbidge and Harrison (1984) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) , Cuñado and de Gracia (2003) and Leduc and Sill (2004) also show that an increase in oil prices brings about declines in industrial production or in output.
However, there is other literature providing evidence that energy price shocks have little effect on the economy. For example, Kim and Loungani (1992) include energy in a real business cycle (RBC) model with exogenous energy prices and find that the inclusion of energy price shocks increases output volatility only modestly. 1) Dhawan and Jeske (2008) obtain similar results by extending the model of Kim and Loungani (1992) . Krugman (2016) also argues that the assumed relationship does not hold, since for example spending for investment falls quickly when oil prices plunge, as a lot of it is tied to oil prices.
More importantly, according to some literature, when more recent data is used the relationship between commodity prices and macroeconomic variables is found to be insignificant or attenuated.
1) This result supports views such as that of Tobin (1980) that the effects of energy price shocks on the economy are not important, since the share of energy in GNP is too small for large aggregate effects to be generated from energy price shocks.
Using vector autoregressions (VARs) over the 1970 -83 and 1984 -2006 periods, Blanchard and Galí (2007 conclude that oil prices had a much lower impact on inflation and output in the second period than they did in the first. According to them, this was due to the lack of concurrent adverse shocks, the smaller share of oil in the economy, more flexible labor markets and improvements in monetary policy during the second period. Segal (2011) also finds that the rises in oil prices during the last few years have had little influence on the economy. 2)
Something that is not discussed in the above literatures is the fact that, as trading in commodity derivatives tied to commodity prices has increased massively since the 2000s 3) (see Figure 1 ), commodities have in recent years begun to function as an asset class, which may have contributed to the weakened relationship noted as well. 4) Specifically, suppose that firms produce goods by using commodities, capital and labor as inputs, and financial intermediaries (FIs) own two assetsone tied to the capital of firms and the other to commodities.
The net worths of FIs will then be affected by the returns on capital and commodities, both of which depend on changes in commodity prices. For instance, a fall in commodity prices will reduce firms'
2) Differently from this literature, Kilian (2009) concludes that the reason why the recent increases in oil prices have not been followed by a U.S. recession is that they were due to strong demand for oil thanks to the booming world economy rather than to oil supply disruptions. Considering the reasons for the changes in commodity prices would be interesting, but is not the purpose of this paper which focuses on why the impacts of commodity price shocks on the economy have declined since the 2000s, irrespective of the shocks' sources. 3) Basu and Gavin (2011) explain well why many financial intermediaries have added commodity derivatives as an asset class to their portfolios. The first reason is the search for higher yields; when the returns on safe assets are low, intermediaries tend to choose riskier assets. Second, they use commodity derivatives to hedge against equity risks, in line with the negative correlation between equity and commodity returns. 4) Separately, many empirical studies have investigated whether the sharp increase in trading in commodity derivatives played a role in the high commodity prices (mainly oil prices) during the 2005-2008 period, i.e. whether speculative trading of commodities affected commodity prices. Most of them have confirmed that speculation has no significant effects on commodity prices (for details see Kilian and Murphy, 2014; Kilian and Lee, 2014; Knittel and Pindyck, 2016; etc.) .
input costs and their outputs will hence rise, which will lead to an increased return on capital. In contrast, the commodity price decline will lead directly to a decreased return on commodities as well. Under this environment, if commodity prices decrease the net worths of FIs will rise by less than in a case in which they hold only capital. This will lead to a smaller increase in FIs' demand for investment, which will partly offset the positive impact of the fall in commodity prices on the economy.
Figure 1. Commodity Derivative Contracts
Note: The values are the year-end notional amounts of commodity derivative contracts for commercial banks, savings associations and trust companies holding derivatives in the U.S. Source: Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Department of the Treasury However, it is impossible to capture the linkage between commodity prices and the net worths of FIs with the existing models in which financial markets are modeled, since these models omit the role of commodities as an asset class. For example, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999, hereafter BGG) assume that entrepreneurs borrow money from FIs to purchase capital and are leveraged. In their model, owing to the existence of the countercyclical external finance premium, when an adverse productivity shock hits the economy, the price of capital falls more initially, which amplifies and propagates the shock to the economy compared to the frictionless models (the financial accelerator). Similarly, other studies also do not consider commodities as an asset class, and in their models FIs or entrepreneurs hold only assets tied to capital (see Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, 2014; etc.) . There are also models that do contain two assets for FIs or entrepreneurs, but they mainly extend the framework of BGG to two-country models and the two assets are thus capital at home and capital in foreign countries (see Ueda, 2012; and Dedola and Lombardo, 2012) . In any case, the existing models consider FIs or entrepreneurs to hold only assets tied to capital.
In this paper, I extend the model with financial frictions and the costly state verification (CSV) approach developed by BGG, by adding to it FIs that invest in assets tied to both commodities and capital. I use this model to show that if FIs can hold two assets, tied to commodities as well as to the capital of firms, then the effects of a negative commodity price shock on the economy will be attenuated.
To be specific, I simulate the responses of macroeconomic variables to a negative commodity price shock in situations of varying proportions of FI investment in commodities relative to that in capital, and compare them to those in a model with FIs' investment in commodities omitted to see whether commodities as an asset class play a role in the reduced impacts of commodity price shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, in which FIs invest in two assetstied both to capital and to commodities. Section 3 presents the simulation results of the model, and explains why its inclusion of commodities as an asset class is important and relevant. Section 4 concludes.
Ⅱ. The Model
In this section I describe the model 5) with financial frictions and FIs investing in two assetstied to capital and to commodities. The model is very close to that of BGG. The main differences between them are that in this model firms use commodities as well as labor and capital as inputs to produce goods, and that FIs invest not only in the shares in capital issued by firms but also in commodities.
Commodities are imported from abroad at an exogenous world price.
Considering that nominal rigidities do not have an intrinsic role in BGG's financial accelerator, I also assume for simplicity that prices are flexible. Finally, I do not consider monetary policy in the model, since it is of no interest in this paper.
Financial Market
The framework of the financial market is closely related to that of Gertler and Karadi (2011). Specifically, firms issue shares to acquire funds that are necessary for purchasing capital for production, and there is no friction in the process of firms obtaining funding from FIs.
Only FIs face credit constraints in obtaining funds from investors.
There are two kinds of contracts in the financial market: loan contracts between FIs and investors, and share contracts between firms and FIs. 6) FIs have their own net worth,  , which is not sufficient for investing in commodities and in shares in capital issued by firms.
FIs thus enter into loan contracts with investors in order to borrow money.
As in BGG, FIs face idiosyncratic shocks,  , to their returns.
Therefore, the ex post gross return to investment of FI  ∈   ⋯ ∞ 5) See Appendix for the details of the model. 6) Since there are no frictions in the share contracts between FIs and firms, the contracts are not described.
is the ex post aggregate return to investment of FIs. ln follows a normal distribution with mean       and variance   , and under this assumption,      . The CDF of  is (․) and the PDF is  (․).  is i.i.d. across time and across FIs. 7)
As in BGG, CSV is assumed. Since the return on FIs' investment is subject to the idiosyncratic shock  , if investors wish to observe the shock for a specific FI they have to pay a monitoring cost, which is a fixed fraction, , of the entire wealth of the FI.
In each period, FI  wishes to invest      in shares in capital issued by firms, and       in commodities.   is the quantity of the shares in capital issued by the firms,  is the price of each share, which is equal to the price of each unit of capital,   is the units of the composite commodity used noncommercially, and  is the price of one unit of the composite commodity. Therefore, FI  needs to borrow pay the monitoring cost and take the entire wealth of FI .
By assuming that in each period FIs expend a fixed ratio,  ∈     , relative to their expenditures on investment in shares in capital issued by firms,      , for investment in commodities, 8) I relax the assumption in BGG that FIs invest all available funds in shares in capital issued by firms, 9) and this implies that
(1)
Thus, the ex post aggregate return to investment of FIs is
where      is the return to FIs' investment in the shares in capital issued by firms, and      is the return to FI's investment in commodities. Since in period  FIs buy    units of the composite commodity at   , and sell them at
where    makes the steady state return to commodity investment,   , equal to the steady state return to investment in shares in capital,   . 10) This can be thought of as the risk spread.
Since this is the standard debt contract, there exists a threshold value of the shocks,    , for FI  (see Townsend, 1979) . If   ≥    , then FI  makes enough profit to repay the investors, while if       , it 8) Since the aim of this paper is to show that, as long as FIs invest some amount in commodities, the impacts of commodity price shocks on the economy become weaker, rather than to analyze how FIs allocate their available funds to the two asset classes, this assumption is not critical. 9) If   , FIs invest all available funds in the shares in capital issued by firms, as in BGG. 10) The variables without the time subscript '' denote their steady state values.
defaults. Then
Denote     ∈   the share of the returns on FI 's investment that goes to the investors. Then,
the monitoring cost, the net share of the returns to FI  going to investors is
Unless the expected profit of the contract is higher than the risk free rate, , investors do not participate in the contract. Therefore, the expected participation constraint is
where   is the expectations operation conditional on the information at .
Risk averse
FIs choose the expenditure on investment,             , and the threshold values of the idiosyncratic shocks,       , so as to maximize the expected logarithm of their profits,
Since the left-hand side of equation (7) is determined exogenously to the financial market, every FI's choice for           is the same. Thus, equation (7) can be aggregated:
Aggregating the expected participation constraints, equation (6), yields
where
Using equations (8) and (9), the relationship between FIs' leverage,               , and the external finance premium can be obtained:
ℵ  . 12) Therefore, leverage is increasing in the external finance premium.
The aggregate net worth of FIs depends on their aggregate earnings from the above contracts, and from their labor incomes since it is 11) See Appendix for details. 12) See Appendix for details.
assumed that FIs inelastically supply one unit of labor to operating firms. Let   be the aggregate earnings of FIs from the above contract.
Then, the aggregate net worth of FIs evolves according to
where 
2. The Rest of the Economy
Households
A representative household chooses its consumption, labor supply and real lending so as to maximize its utility. For simplicity, log utility function of consumption and separability between consumption and labor are assumed. The utility function is
where   is consumption,    is the labor supply by households,  is the discount factor, and  is the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply. 13) 13) Some papers such as Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2011) assume that households consume commodities. However, for simplicity, I do not consider commodity consumption in the model, since it does not play a notable role in generating the results of this paper.
The budget constraint is
where   is the real lending,   is the real wage,   is the real return from lending, and   is the profits remitted by firms.
The first order conditions of a representative household's utility maximization problem are
Equation (15) is the Euler equation, and equation (16) is the condition of intratemporal substitution between consumption and labor.
Firms
A representative firm produces goods using capital, labor and commodities. The production function is a nested CES with constant returns to scale, following Kim and Loungani (1992) and Dhawan and Jeske (2008):
where  is the units of the composite commodity used in production,  is the capital inputs, and    is the labor share of income. The parameter  determines the importance of the commodities. The parameter  is equal to      , where  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and commodities.  is the productivity, and follows an AR(1) process as usual:
where   is the productivity shock. As in BGG,   is a composite of the labor that is supplied by households (   ) and FIs (    ).   is expressed by
In each period, firms issue shares in order to purchase capital for production, which means that
Firms purchase capital at the end of period    to produce goods in period , and sell the non-depreciated capital back to the capital goods producers at the end of period . Hence, the profit maximization problem is
where  is the depreciation rate, and  is the commodity input. The corresponding first order conditions with respect to    and     are
The realized return on capital is obtained by the first order condition with respect to   :
The first order condition with respect to   is
Commodity prices are determined exogenously, and follow AR(1) 14) as in Wei (2003):
where   is the commodity price shocks.
Capital Goods Producers
The capital goods producers use their technology to convert final goods to capital goods. In each period they buy   of final goods and     of used capital from firms. They then produce new capital goods,     . Thus, the capital goods producer's problem is the following:
subject to the law of motion for capital
14) Although this is different from Kim and Loungani (1992) and Dhawan and Jeske (2008) , in which energy prices follow ARMA(1,1), this difference does not affect the results of the model simulation.
where  is the parameter associated with the adjustment costs. The first order condition gives the price of capital:
Resource Constraint
In each period, all produced goods are used for either consumption, investment, purchases of commodities by firms for production, commodity investment by FIs, or the monitoring costs of investors.
Thus, the resource constraint is given by
The last term is the monitoring cost of investors. 15) 15) Note that, according to BGG,   and the monitoring cost have relatively low weights under any reasonable parameterization of the model, and thus have no recognizable effects on the dynamics. Ⅲ
. Model Analysis
Calibration
The parameter values are given in Table 1 . They mainly follow BGG and Kim and Loungani (1992) , and the calibration is based on quarterly U.S. data.
First of all, the U.S. Treasury Department data shows that during the 1998 to 2015 period the average ratio of the value of FIs' commodity derivative contracts, relative to the value of their total assets minus the value of their commodity derivative contracts, was around 0.08.  is therefore set to 0.08, which means that FIs invest 8% of the amount that they invest in the shares in capital issued by firms, in commodities. In order to show how the responses of the macroeconomic variables to a negative commodity price shock change as FIs' investment in commodities increases, I also consider two more cases for the values of :   , in which FIs invest only in the shares in capital issued by firms, and   , in which FIs invest 4% of their expenditure on investment in the shares in commodities.
In keeping with much of the literature, the discount factor,  , is 0.99, the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply,  , is set to 3, the depreciation rate, , is assumed to be 0.025, the parameter associated with capital adjustment costs, , is 10, and the labor share of income,    , is equal to 0.64.
Following BGG, the share of FIs' labor inputs,   , is 0.01, the rate of failure of FIs,      , is 0.03/4, and the steady state risk spread,    , is assumed to be 0.005, which implies that    . Since      ,   . I assume that the steady state ratio of capital to the FIs' net worth,  , is 4 (the same as in Gertler and Karadi, 2011), which implies that the steady state ratio of commodity investment to net worth,    , is equal to  by equation (1).
As in Kim and Loungani (1992) , I assume that the parameter related to the elasticity of substitution between capital and commodity inputs in production, , is 0.7. The steady state capital/commodity ratio, , is assumed to be 126.2. 16) Accordingly, the parameter related to the importance of commodities in production, , is 0.007, which is determined by the values of ,   ,  and  from equations (24) and (25) in the steady state. Finally, I assume that the autoregressive parameter for commodity prices, , is 0.95 as in Wei (2003) .
Effects of a Negative Commodity Price Shock
This section shows how the model responds to a negative commodity price shock. By conducting this analysis, the way in which the existence of commodities as an asset class can dampen the effects of commodity price shocks on the economy can be shown. Figure   3 presents the responses of the model, with various values of , to a negative 1% deviation shock to commodity prices.
First, consider the case of   , in which FIs invest only in the shares in capital issued by firms. Since a negative commodity price shock leads to a fall in firms' input costs, their demands for both commodities and capital increase. Thus, the price of capital,  , jumps, which leads to a rise in FIs' returns on investment in the shares in capital issued by firms,    . Since from equation (2) the FIs' aggregate return on investment,    , is equal to    when   ,    increases.
Due to the realized participation constraint, equation (9), a rise in   brings about a fall in the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shocks,   , since    . That is, as FIs' aggregate return on investment increases, their default probability falls. Because   and the share of the profits going to FIs in the loan contract,        , increase (   ), the net worth of FIs,  , rises in accordance with equation (11). More intuitively, a rise in FIs' aggregate return on investment leads to an increase in their net worth. Therefore, owing to the increases in  and in the demand for capital, the investment goes up and output thus expands.
However, since when  ∈  the shock brings about a fall in 17)       and     when   , and       and     when   .
the FIs' returns on investment in commodities,   ,   rises by less or decreases even despite a rise in   . The smaller rise or fall in   leads to a lesser amount of decrease or to an increase in   , and        thus rises by less or goes down. Given the smaller increases or the decreases in   and        ,  also rises by less or falls. FIs' investment in the shares in capital issued by firms thus increases by less. Although demand for capital grows due to a fall in commodity prices, investment rises by less than when    owing to the smaller increase or the decrease in  . Output therefore increases by less than in the case of   . In other words, the more the assets tied to commodities that FIs hold, the less  increases, and thus the less investment and output rise.
To summarize, if FIs own assets tied to commodities, investment and output will increase to a lesser extent following a negative commodity price shock. This is mainly because a fall in commodity prices causes not only an increase in the returns to FIs' investments in assets tied to capital, but also a fall in their returns on investment in commodities. As a result, FIs' returns on total investment go up by less than in the models in which FIs hold only assets associated with capital, or even decrease, and their net worth hence falls or rises by less. Thus, considering that commodities have begun to function as an asset class since the 2000s, and that according to the literature such as Blanchard and Galí (2007) 
Importance and Relevance of Commodities as an Asset Class
The importance and relevance of commodities as an asset class in this model result from the fact that, by investing in commodities, FIs can hedge against the risks to their investments in the shares in capital issued by firms stemming from commodity price shocks.
To be specific, the demand for commodities in production, , is decreasing in commodity prices, and the return to capital,   , is increasing in . Hence,   is decreasing in commodity prices.
However, the return on commodity investment,   , is increasing in commodity prices. Therefore,   and   react in the opposite directions to changes in commodity prices, which enables FIs to hedge against the risks from commodity price shocks to their investments in the shares in capital issued by firms by investing in commodities. For instance, a rise in commodity prices will lead to an increase in   by equation (3), but to a fall in   by equations (24) and (25). If FIs do not invest in commodities, their returns on investment,   , will fall. In this model, however, since FIs hold commodities as an asset   declines due to a rise in   by less than when they do not hold them,
i.e. when FIs invest in commodities their returns on investment fluctuate by less in response to commodity price shocks.
The existence of commodities as an asset class in this model is very consistent with the fact that FIs use commodity derivatives to hedge against equity risks, which is noted in the literature such as Basu and Gavin (2011 
From the definition of a cumulative log-normal distribution,
Therefore, the first derivatives with respect to  of      ,      ,      and      can be obtained:
where (․) is the PDF of the standard normal distribution.
The sign of   Relationship between the external finance premium and leverage From equations (8) and (9), 
